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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND DIRECTED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET
Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre*
Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS) on technological change, exploiting
installations level inclusion criteria to estimate the System’s causal impact
on firms’ patenting. We find that the EU ETS has increased low-carbon
innovation among regulated firms by as much as 10%, while not crowd-
ing out patenting for other technologies. We also find evidence that the
EU ETS has not affected patenting beyond the set of regulated companies.
These results imply that the EU ETS accounts for nearly a 1% increase in
European low-carbon patenting compared to a counterfactual scenario.
I. Introduction
EMISSIONS trading programs have assumed an evermore prominent role in environmental policy over the
past few decades. In the United States, the Acid Rain Pro-
gram, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and
California’s cap-and-trade program are all examples of this
trend. Australia, New Zealand, and the Canadian province
of Quebec have all recently created their own cap-and-trade
programs to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. China has
initiated several pilot programs in anticipation of a national
market that will be launched in 2017. Japan, South Korea,
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile are individually making moves
toward launching their own. Global carbon markets are
worth over $175 billion a year according to recent figures
(Kossoy & Guigon, 2012) and cover over 20% of global
greenhouse gas emissions (Kossoy et al., 2013). With so
many new initiatives in the works, these numbers will likely
grow much larger in years to come.
At present, most of the $175 billion a year is accounted
for by the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS), today the largest cap-and-trade program in the world.
The EU ETS was launched in 2005, allocating tradable emis-
sions permits to over 12,000 power stations and industrial
plants in 24 countries, accounting for over 40% of the EU’s
total greenhouse gas emissions. Like all of the other new
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emissions trading initiatives around the globe, the EU ETS
was expected not only to reduce carbon emissions in a cost-
effective manner but also to spur the development of new
low-carbon technologies. When regulated firms expect to
face a higher price on emissions relative to other costs of pro-
duction, this provides them with an incentive to make oper-
ational changes and investments that reduce the emissions
intensity of their output. The induced innovation hypothe-
sis, dating back to Sir John Hicks (1932) and restated in the
context of environmental policy by Porter (1991) and Ace-
moglu et al. (2012), suggests that part of this new investment
will be directed toward developing and commercializing
new emissions-reducing technologies. The primary objective
of carbon market programs is of course to reduce emis-
sions, but from an economic perspective, it is crucial that
they also provide incentives for technological change, since
new technologies may substantially reduce the long-run
cost of abatement (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2003; Stavins,
2007). From a political perspective, induced innovation may
improve the acceptability of these policies. Indeed, EU pol-
icy makers have often articulated their vision that the EU
ETS would be a driving force of low-carbon innovation and
economic growth (see European Commission, 2005, 2012).
In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive investi-
gation of the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon technolog-
ical change in the first five years of the System’s existence.
The EU ETS offers a unique opportunity to investigate the
impact of environmental policy on technological change. It
is the first and largest environmental policy initiative of its
kind anywhere in the world, which by itself would make
it an interesting case to study. But more important is the
fact that in order to control administrative costs, the EU
ETS was designed to cover only large installations. Firms
operating smaller installations are not covered by EU ETS
regulations, although the firms themselves might be just as
large as those affected by the regulations.1 Because inno-
vation takes place at the firm level, we can exploit these
installation-level inclusion criteria to compare firms with
similar resources available for research and similar patent-
ing histories, but which have fallen under different regulatory
regimes since 2005. This provides an opportunity to apply
the sort of quasi-experimental techniques most suited to
assessing the causal impacts of environmental policies (List
et al., 2003; Greenstone & Gayer, 2009). Studies employ-
ing these methods have found that environmental regulations
inhibit new-plant formation (List et al., 2003) but stimulate
capital investment in existing plants (Fowlie, 2010). To our
1 Although the EU ETS regulations are applied at the level of the instal-
lation, we often use “EU ETS firms” or “regulated firms” as shorthand for
firms operating at least one EU ETS–regulated installation.
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knowledge, though, this is the first time these methods have
been employed to study the impact of environmental policy
on directed technological change.
We use a newly constructed data set that records patenting
activities, key firm characteristics, and regulatory status with
respect to the EU ETS. Our data set includes information on
over 30 million firms across 23 countries, 18 of which took
part in the 2005 launch of the EU ETS. We identify over
5,500 firms operating more than 9,000 installations regulated
under the EU ETS, accounting for over 80% of EU ETS–
wide emissions. Using this data set, we are able to compare
unregulated and would-be regulated firms both before and
after the EU ETS launched. The low-carbon patent classifica-
tion recently developed by the European Patent Office (EPO)
allows us to identify emissions reduction technologies. A
matched difference-in-differences study design enables us
to control for confounding factors that affect both regu-
lated and unregulated firms (e.g., input prices, sector- and
country-specific policies), as well as firm-level heterogeneity
(Heckman, Ichimura, Smith et al. 1998; Heckman, Ichimura,
& Todd, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005; Abadie, 2005). Our
estimates provide the first comprehensive empirical assess-
ment of the impact of the EU ETS on directed technological
change.
A casual look at aggregate patent data reveals a surge in
low-carbon patenting since 2005. The increase appears larger
among EU ETS–regulated companies, and our matched
difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect
implies that the EU ETS is responsible for a 36.2% increase
in low-carbon patenting among our matched sample of 3,428
EU ETS firms, or an increase of 9.1% across all of the 5,500
EU ETS firms. Because these firms account for only a small
portion of all patents, however, this would account for less
than a 1% increase of low-carbon patenting at the EPO. Put
another way, only 2% of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon
patenting can be attributed to the EU ETS.
With respect to concerns that low-carbon innovation
would crowd out the development of other technologies
(Popp & Newell, 2012), we find evidence that the EU ETS
has in fact encouraged patenting for other technologies, but
by a very small amount. We investigate several challenges to
the internal and external validity of our results (e.g., omitted
variable bias and a failure of “selection on observables”), but
our conclusions appear to be robust.
For fear that a focus on EU ETS firms would have blink-
ered us to a broader indirect impact of the EU ETS, we
identify 12,000 likely third-party technology providers and
purchasers and test whether these firms also responded to
the EU ETS. The estimates are only indicative, but we find
no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had either a net
positive or net negative impact on the patenting activities of
third parties. Taken together, our findings suggest that while
EU ETS–regulated firms have responded strongly, the sys-
tem so far has had at best a very limited impact on the overall
pace and direction of technological change. The EU ETS
is expected to remain an integral part of the EU’s strategy
for building a low-carbon Europe (European Commission,
2011), but in its current form, the EU ETS may not be pro-
viding incentives for low-carbon technological change on a
large scale.
Technological change may be the most important deter-
minant of the long-run cost of emissions abatement. Conse-
quently, the ability of an environmental policy to influence
technological change is perhaps one of the most important
criteria on which to judge its success (Kneese & Schultze,
1975; Pizer & Popp, 2008). In light of this, it is not surprising
that both theoretical and empirical economists are engaged in
ongoing efforts to better understand the capacity of environ-
mental policies to induce clean innovation. On the theoretical
side, the past few decades have seen the emergence of a
considerable literature further developing the induced inno-
vation hypothesis, especially in the context of climate change
mitigation (Goulder & Schneider, 1999; van der Zwaan et al.,
2002; Popp, 2004; Gerlagh, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
On the empirical side, a large and growing research enter-
prise is trying to understand and quantify the link between
environmental policies and directed technological change,
often with innovation measured at the level of economic
sectors or countries (Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; Newell, Jaffe, &
Stavins, 1999; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2002;
Aghion et al., 2012; and many others; see Popp, Newell, &
Jaffe, 2010, Popp, 2010, and Ambec et al., 2013, for recent
surveys). Our study contributes to this literature and ana-
lyzes policy impacts at the firm level. The handful of studies
that have begun to investigate the innovation impact of the
EU ETS rely on interview-based methodologies, and most
analyze small unrepresentative samples (Hoffmann, 2007;
Tomás et al., 2010; Anderson, Convery, & Maria, 2011).
Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2011) take extra precautions
to ensure consistency across interviews with different firms,
and they conduct the largest study to date covering 450 EU
ETS firms in 6 countries. We use patent portfolios as an
objective proxy of technological change, and our study con-
siders over 5,500 EU ETS firms in 18 countries, accounting
for roughly 80% of the program as a whole. With this, we
provide the first comprehensive empirical estimates of the
system’s impact on directed technological change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II surveys the evi-
dence on environmental policy and directed technological
change, especially in the context of emissions trading. Evi-
dence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program and early studies of
the EU ETS inform us about how the EU ETS is likely to
have affected technological change. In section III, we famil-
iarize ourselves with our newly constructed data set and use
it to begin unpacking the characteristics of low-carbon tech-
nological change. In section IV, we turn our eye to estimating
the impact of the EU ETS on regulated firms, and in section
V we examine its indirect impact on third-party technol-
ogy providers and purchasers. Section VI summarizes and
discusses the evidence in light of the broader empirical lit-
erature. We conclude by considering some of the potential
policy implications of our findings and directions for future
research.
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II. Emissions Trading and Directed Technological
Change
A. Empirical Background
Several studies have found evidence that environmental
policy does have an impact on the direction of technological
change (Lanjouw & Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier & Cohen,
2003; Popp, 2002, 2003, 2006; Arimura, Hibiki, & John-
stone, 2007; Lanoie, et al., 2007; Johnstone, Hašcˇicˇ, & Popp,
2010). But while there appears to be a general link between
environmental policy and directed technological change, a
more careful reading of the literature yields two cautionary
observations that seem particularly relevant for the EU ETS.
First, the impact of emissions trading programs specif-
ically, rather than environmental policies more broadly
construed, appears to be more modest. Most studies con-
sider the Acid Rain Program, which in 1995 replaced the
traditional regulatory regime for sulfur dioxide emissions
from U.S. power plants. Patenting for sulfur dioxide control
technologies began a precipitous decline after 1995 (Tay-
lor, 2012), although there was an increase in patents that
improve the efficiency of sulfur scrubbers (Popp, 2003). The
latter effect was confined to early years of the new regime,
though, and the program has not provided ongoing incen-
tives for technological advancement (Lange & Bellas, 2005).
Early estimates suggested that nearly half of the emissions
reductions were achieved by installing scrubber technology
and the remainder by switching to coal with a lower sulfur
content (Schmalensee et al., 1998), but the use of scrubber
technology as an abatement strategy has declined over time
(Burtraw & Szambelan, 2009).2 To put it simply, past emis-
sions trading programs like the Acid Rain Program do not
provide a precedent for the kind of induced technological
change that EU policymakers are hoping the EU ETS will
provide.
Second, if we expected the incentives for technologi-
cal development to be mediated primarily by augmenting
energy prices, historical estimates of the energy price elas-
ticity of energy-saving technology patents might provide a
very rough idea of the effect the EU ETS might be having.
Popp (2002) suggests that even at the height of the energy
crisis of the late 1970s, the hike in energy prices eventually
boosted the share of energy-saving patents by only 3.14%.
The carbon price in the EU ETS, having ranged from a peak
of near 30 euros to a low of near 0 euros (and spending
more time in the lower part of that range), does not imply
anything close to the patenting response seen after the oil
shock.3 One might therefore expect the patenting response,
2 It is worth noting also that Title IV of the Clean Air Act, which established
the Acid Rain Program, included special provisions that rewarded firms
specifically for the use of scrubbers. It is not entirely clear, therefore, how
much of the initial investment in scrubbers was the market’s doing.
3 Popp (2002) estimates that the energy price hike of nearly 10% increased
the share of energy-saving patenting by 3.14%. European energy production
emitted roughly 355 grams of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour in 2005, and
industrial energy users paid about 0.07 euros per kilowatt-hour that year.
If the average carbon price of 10 euros was entirely passed onto users, that
if any, to be small. This back-of-the-envelope comparison
comes with serious health warnings, of course, not the least
of which is that innovation may be driven more by expecta-
tions than currently prevailing prices (Martin et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, it may aid our expectations about the likely
impact of the EU ETS.
B. The EU ETS and Directed Technological Change
In 2005, the EU ETS launched in 24 countries across
Europe, covering roughly 40% of the EU’s total greenhouse
gas emissions. Power stations and industrial plants across
Europe were classified according to their main activity: com-
bustion, cement, paper and pulp, and so on. Activity-specific
size criteria then determined which installations would be
included in the EU ETS. For instance, only combustion
installations with a yearly thermal input exceeding 20 MWh
were covered. Each year, fewer and fewer tradable emissions
permits are allocated to the more than 12,000 qualifying
installations, which are each legally required to surrender
enough permits every year to cover their emissions. Prior
to the compliance date, however, installation operators can
freely trade permits with each other (as well as with financial
intermediaries and private citizens).4 Since 2005, the spot
price has varied between 0 euros and 30 euros. The average
price between 2005 and 2009 was around 10 euros, although
the actual price spent more time closer to 0 euros. The price
of forward contracts has remained steadily above the spot
price, though, suggesting firms are taking the progressive
stringency of the cap into account. Installations, or, rather,
the firms that operate them, can then make abatement and
investment decisions according to the carbon price revealed
in the market.
Since the EU ETS launched in 2005, there has been
vigorous debate about whether it would induce firms to
develop new emissions-reducing technologies, many argu-
ing that an overly generous allocation of emissions permits
would largely undermine the incentives to innovate (Schleich
& Betz, 2005; Gagelmann & Frondel, 2005; Grubb, Azar,
& Persson, 2005). So far, fuel switching appears to have
been very important. Fuel switching is a purely organiza-
tional innovation and requires neither capital investment nor
would imply about a 5% increase of industrial energy prices and an eventual
boost to patenting of 1.87%. The number is likely to be substantially lower
in practice, however, if we account for lower rates of cost pass-through and
the fact that most low-carbon innovation in Europe takes place in the coun-
tries that already have relatively higher energy prices and are less carbon
intensive to begin with. In France, for instance, even with 100% of regu-
latory costs passed on to users, one would expect the share of patenting to
rise by less than 0.5%.
4 The system has been implemented in three trading phases, with succes-
sively more stringent emissions caps for each phase. Phase 1, which ran
from 2005 to 2007, was insulated from later phases by prohibiting banking
and borrowing of permits across the phase boundary. Phase 2 (2008–2012)
and phase 3 (2013–2020) allow firms to bank unused permits for later use,
as well as a limited form of borrowing against future emissions reductions.
See Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis (2010) for a more comprehensive
review of the design and implementation of the EU ETS.
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R&D, only that power providers bring less polluting gas-
fired plants online before coal-fired ones as demand ramps
up. This changes the fuel mix in favor of natural gas and
therefore reduces the carbon intensity of output.5 Macro-
economic estimates suggest that the EU ETS reduced total
emissions by roughly 50 million to 100 million tonnes of
carbon dioxide annually in phase 1, or roughly 3% to 6%,
compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Ellerman &
Buchner, 2008; Anderson & Di Maria, 2011). Meanwhile,
model-based estimates of power sector emissions abatement
from fuel switching range from 26 million to 88 million
tonnes per year (Delarue, Ellerman, & D’haeseleer, 2010;
Delarue, Voorspools, & D’haeseleer, 2008), which suggests
that fuel switching likely accounts for the lion’s share of
emissions reductions in the EU ETS so far.
This is not a problem in and of itself, of course. As
mentioned earlier, the U.S. Acid Rain Program achieved its
emissions targets in large part by analogous fuel-switching
strategies and with little technological change. However, one
should be conscious that in the case of the EU ETS, the
capacity for emissions reductions through fuel switching
is far more limited relative to the EU’s long-term targets.
Delarue et al. (2008) estimate that fuel switching has the
potential to reduce emissions by up to 300 million tonnes
annually, which is no more than one-tenth of what is needed
to meet the EU target to cut emissions by 80% by 2050
against 1990 levels.6
In addition to the evidence on fuel switching, a grow-
ing literature of case studies and expert interviews indicates
that rather than developing new technologies, firms have
been introducing well-known technological solutions that
had simply not been economically viable without the EU
ETS carbon price (Petsonk & Cozijnsen, 2007; Tomás et
al., 2010). Martin et al. (2011) conducted interviews with
nearly 800 European manufacturing firms, of which almost
450 fell under EU ETS regulations. Using their interview-
based measure of innovation, they find a positive effect of
the expected future stringency of EU ETS.
Few studies have inquired about more objective proxies
of innovation, like R&D or patenting. A survey of Irish EU
ETS firms tentatively suggested that almost no resources
were made available for low-carbon R&D in the first trading
phase (2005–2007), while many of the firms had pursued
more operational innovations like installing new machinery
or equipment, making process or behavioral changes, and
employing fuel switching to some degree (Anderson et al.,
2011). Hoffmann (2007), reporting on the German electricity
sector, finds that the EU ETS has had an effect on decisions
about small-scale investments with short amortization times
5 In other contexts, “fuel switching” may refer to structural and tech-
nological changes over long time horizons, such as the global shift from
biomass to fossil fuels as the dominant energy carrier over the past two cen-
turies. Throughout, we use the term more narrowly to refer to the short-run
operational shift between coal and gas.
6 The EU target amounts to reducing annual emissions by roughly 4,500
million tonnes compared to 1990, or roughly 3,500 million tonnes compared
to current emission levels.
but not on R&D efforts. Neither study, however, provides a
sufficiently large or representative sample of EU ETS firms
to offer a reliable picture of the innovation response to the
EU ETS. Moreover, neither study offers for comparison a
group of non–EU ETS firms.
All of this provides only fragmentary or indirect evidence
on directed technological change, and it is difficult to sum-
marize our expectations of the EU ETS’s impact in terms
of a clear quantitative hypothesis. The general literature on
induced innovation would lead us to expect the EU ETS to
have a positive impact on low-carbon innovation. Studies
of earlier emissions trading programs, however, indicate a
weak or absent impact, and studies of the EU ETS generally
have been unable to detect an effect thus far. Our purpose
next, therefore, is to obtain more direct empirical evidence
on whether and to what extent the EU ETS is encouraging
firms to develop new low-carbon technologies.
III. Unpacking Low-Carbon Technological Change
While EU ETS regulations apply at the level of the instal-
lation, innovation takes place at the level of the firm, and
recent advances in linking patent data with company data
make it possible to construct firm-level patent portfolios.
This paper exploits a newly constructed data set, joining
patent portfolios with key firm characteristics, including
whether the firm operates any installations covered by EU
ETS regulations.
Patents have been used extensively as a measure of tech-
nological change in the recent induced innovation literature
(Popp, 2002, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010; Aghion et al.,
2012), and the advantages and drawbacks of patents are well
understood (see OECD, 2009, for a survey). For instance, not
all innovations are patentable, and even when one is, patent-
ing is only one of several ways to protect it. The propensity to
file patents and the economic value of patents consequently
differ between sectors. However, there are very few examples
of economically significant inventions that have not been
patented (Dernis, Guellec, & Pottelsberghe, 2001), and the
production of patented knowledge and tacit knowledge has
been found to be positively correlated (Cohen, Nelson, &
Walsh, 2000; Arora, Ceccagnoli, & Cohen, 2008). More-
over, it is possible to mitigate the deficiencies in patent-based
measures by comparing companies active in the same sector
and focusing on higher-value patents. In sum, patent-based
measures do not weigh or capture all aspects of innovations
equally, but are generally considered to provide a useful
proxy measure of the output of innovative activity and are
available at a highly disaggregated technological level. It
is also worth noting that patent counts (output) and R&D
expenditures (input) have been found to be highly correlated
in cross-section (Griliches, 1984) and shift concurrently over
time and in response to shocks (Kaufer, 1989).
Our main measure of technological change uses patents
filed with the European Patent Office (EPO). EPO patents
provide a common measure of innovation for all of Europe,
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unlike self-reported innovation measures or patents filed
with national patent offices, for which the standards vary
from firm to firm or country to country. In addition, EPO
patents provide a useful quality threshold as only high-value
inventions typically get patented at the EPO.7 Neverthe-
less, as a robustness test we also repeat our analysis using
quality-weighted patent counts.8
All patents filed at the EPO are categorized using the Euro-
pean patent classification (ECLA), which includes a recently
developed class pertaining to “technologies or applications
for mitigation or adaptation against climate change” (“low-
carbon technologies,” for short). This new category (the Y02
class) is the result of an unprecedented effort by the EPO
whereby patent examiners specialized in each technology,
with the help of external experts, developed a tagging sys-
tem for all patents ever filed at the EPO that are related to
climate change mitigation technologies. The Y02 class pro-
vides the most accurate tagging of climate change mitigation
patents available today and is becoming the international
standard for clean innovation studies.9 It includes, to name
a few examples, efficient combustion technologies (e.g.,
combined heat and power generation), carbon capture and
storage, efficient electricity distribution (e.g., smart grids),
and energy storage (e.g., fuel cells), which helps us measure
the direction of technological change.10 (A complete list of
the subclasses of low-carbon patents used in the paper can
be found in appendix C in the online appendix.)
The EPO was set up in 1978. Since then, over 2.5 million
patents have been filed with it, of which just over 50,000
(or 2%) have been classified as low-carbon inventions. Our
newly constructed data set includes the patent portfolios of
over 30 million firms located in 23 countries (21 EU coun-
tries, Switzerland, and the United States). Eighteen of these
7 Evidence shows that the highest-value technologies are patented in sev-
eral countries (Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003), and indeed, one of the
methods used to measure the value of patents is to count the number of
countries is which they are filed (van Zeebroeck, 2011). Patents filed at the
EPO get patented in six EPO member countries on average.
8 Although the EPO provides a common measure of minimum patent qual-
ity, the value of patents is still known to be heterogeneous. We account for
the quality of patents in two ways: forward citations and family size. Cita-
tion data have been widely used in the literature to control for the quality
of patents. With this method, patents are weighted by the number of times
each of them is cited in subsequent patents (see Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff
et al., 1999; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). The family of a patent is
the set of patents protecting the same invention in various countries (patent
family information comes from the DOCDB family table in PATSTAT).
Counting the number of countries in which a patent is filed is another com-
mon measure of patent quality (Harhoff et al., 2003; van Zeebroeck, 2011).
Family data also have the advantage of being more rapidly available than
citations (patents are typically mostly cited two years after their publica-
tion, hence four years after they are first filed), which is especially valuable
when dealing with recent patents, as we do here.
9 Importantly, the Y02 class is consistently applied to patents filed both
before and after the EU ETS was introduced. See Veefkind et al. (2012) for
more details on how this class was constructed.
10 We also test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of addi-
tional patents that other authors have considered low carbon, in particular
patents pertaining to energy-efficient industrial processes. An updated
list of environment-related patent classification codes is available from
the OECD’s Environmental Policy and Technological Innovation (EPTI)
website: www.oecd.org/environment/innovation.
Figure 1.—Share of Low-Carbon Patents, 1978–2009
countries launched the EU ETS in 2005. The other five (Nor-
way, Switzerland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the United States)
either joined later or have remained outside the EU ETS alto-
gether. While our data are somewhat more geographically
restricted than the EPO, the firms in our data set account
for just over 95% of all patents filed at the EPO, so we are
confident that we have managed to include the patent history
of the vast majority of companies.11
The share of patents protecting low-carbon technologies
shows a distinct pattern over time (figure 1). There was a
surge in patenting for these technologies in the early 1980s,
often attributed to the second oil price shock in the late
1970s (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011). The share of low-carbon
patents filed each year then stayed roughly level until the
mid-1990s, after which it began to rise again. The share of
low-carbon patents has increased rapidly in recent years, as is
particularly evident after 2005, with the share doubling from
2% to 4% in just a few years. A simple Chow test strongly
rejects the hypothesis that there is no structural break in 2005
( p < 0.001).
While this pattern is robust to using an expanded definition
of “low-carbon technologies,” it is not present for any set of
environmentally friendly technologies. To see this, figure 1
also plots the share of patents protecting nongreenhouse gas
“pollution control technologies,” as defined by Popp (2006),
which does not display the same structural break (one cannot
reject the hypothesis of no structural break in 2005 at conven-
tional significance levels).12 The sudden surge in patenting
activity therefore appears to be specific to low-carbon tech-
nologies and to coincide with the launch of the EU ETS.
Could the structural break in low-carbon patenting, then, be
a consequence of the EU ETS?
Just as the increase in low-carbon patenting in the early
1980s has been attributed to the oil price shock, the recent
surge might be due to rising oil prices. When comparing the
share of low-carbon patenting with the evolution of oil prices
11 We have also conducted extensive manual double-checking, so we can
reasonably assume that companies for which we were unable to locate
patent records have not filed any patents at the EPO. It is well documented
that only a fraction of companies ever file patents, and this is likely to be
especially true of EPO filings, which have high administrative costs.
12 These technologies pertain to reduction of local pollutants including
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide.
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Figure 2.—Share of Low-Carbon Patents and Crude Oil Prices,
1978–2009
(see figure 2), one notices that the recent surge in patenting
follows immediately on the heels of rapid oil price increases
in the early 2000s. Patenting for pollution control, however,
was not responsive to the oil price in the 1980s, and so it is
not surprising it has stayed flat recently. Clearly, looking at
the aggregate trends over time is not enough to determine
whether the increase in low-carbon patenting since 2005 is
the result of the EU ETS, oil prices, or some other factor.
In order to isolate the impact of the EU ETS, we can try
comparing the experience of firms regulated under the EU
ETS with those not covered by the regulation. Both groups
faced the same oil prices and other macroeconomic con-
ditions, but starting in 2005 they were subject to different
regulatory regimes.
Due to a technology supplier’s imperfect ability to appro-
priate the gains from her invention, economic theory predicts
that environmental regulations would produce greater incen-
tives to develop new technologies for regulated firms than for
unregulated firms (Milliman & Prince, 1989; Fischer, Parry,
& Pizer, 2003). Even if the system increases the incentive
for low-carbon innovation for everyone by creating demand
for low-carbon technologies among EU ETS firms, regu-
lated firms receive an additional benefit because they can
fully appropriate the gains from reducing their own compli-
ance costs. To this, one may add whatever effects may result
from the EU ETS increasing the salience of carbon man-
agement issues within regulated companies. It is, of course,
an empirical question whether the EU ETS has encouraged
low-carbon innovation for unregulated firms as well, one that
we return to in sections IV and V, but for now, it is enough
to realize that the EU ETS is likely to encourage innovation
for regulated and unregulated firms to different extents.
Our data set also records the regulatory status of 30 mil-
lion firms—5,568 firms in our data set operate at least one
installation regulated under the EU ETS. Together they oper-
ate 9,358 EU ETS–regulated installations, accounting for
over 90% of regulated installations and emissions in phase 1
in the eighteen EU ETS countries we are studying, and
roughly 80% of installations and emissions EU ETS–wide
(see table 1).13
13 See appendix A in the online appendix for more details on how the link
between firm data and regulatory data was constructed.
Table 1.—Coverage of the EU ETS
Percent of Percent of
Number of Mtonnes of Installations Emissions
Installations Emissions Covered Covered
Austria 217 97.8 92.2 100.0
Belgium 345 178.7 98.6 100.0
Czech Republic 415 290.8 92.5 96.9
Denmark 399 93.1 92.7 95.2
Estonia 54 56.3 77.8 99.9
Finland 637 133.9 84.6 100.0
France 1,100 450.2 97.5 99.6
Germany 1,944 1,486.3 98.6 99.6
Ireland 121 57.7 76.9 94.7
Lithuania 113 34.4 87.6 91.4
Luxembourg 15 9.7 100.0 100.0
Netherlands 418 259.3 87.1 95.6
Poland 869 712.7 90.0 98.6
Portugal 265 110.7 99.2 99.9
Slovakia 191 91.4 90.6 99.9
Spain 1,072 498.1 98.5 99.9
Sweden 774 67.6 93.9 98.8
United Kingdom 1,107 628.0 83.3 97.0
Total 10,056 5,256.6 93.1 98.7
Total EU ETS 12,122 6,321.3 77.2 82.0
The first two columns of this table show the number of phase 1 installations in each of the eighteen
countries in our sample, and their allocated emissions (source: CITL). The following two columns show
the percentages of installations and emissions for which the operating firm has been identified. The two
rows at the foot of the table summarize our data set’s EU ETS coverage for our eighteen countries, as well
as as a proportion of the EU ETS as a whole.
Figure 3.—Comparing the Share of Low-Carbon Patents, 1978–2009
Having identified the subset of firms directly affected by
the EU ETS, we can now look separately at the EU ETS
and non–EU ETS trends in low-carbon patenting. Figure 3
shows that the share of low-carbon patents was roughly the
same among EU ETS and non–EU ETS firms in the five
years before the EU ETS launched. After 2005, the share
of low-carbon patents among EU ETS firms looks to have
risen faster than among non–EU ETS firms.14 The difference
does not become apparent until the start of the second trad-
ing phase in 2008, which was widely expected to constrain
emissions more tightly than phase 1 had done. Could the
14 One might be concerned that the surge in patenting activity by EU ETS
firms compared to non–EU ETS companies might have been accompanied
by a concurrent drop in the relative average quality of inventions patented
by EU ETS companies. However, the average number of citations received
by low-carbon patents filed by EU ETS companies since 2005 does not
significantly differ from those filed by non–EU ETS companies. Similarly,
the size of low-carbon patent families is the same for EU ETS and non–EU
ETS companies.
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post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting be a consequence
of the EU ETS after all?
Let us naively suppose for a moment that the differences
visible in figure 3 are entirely due to the EU ETS. EU ETS
firms filed 2,189 low-carbon patents from 2005 to 2009 com-
pared to 972 patents in the five preceding years (an increase
of 125%), while non–EU ETS firms filed 19,841 and 12,037
low-carbon patents in the corresponding periods (an increase
of 65%). If we were to assume that the number of low-carbon
patents filed by EU ETS firms, had they not been regulated,
would have grown at the same rate experienced by non–EU
ETS firms, we can naively estimate how many low-carbon
patents the EU ETS has added so far: 2,189 – 1.65 × 972
= 585.2. This amounts to a 2.6% increase in the number of
low-carbon patents at the EPO compared to what it would
have been without the EU ETS.
This is clearly a very naive estimate. It assumes that the
patenting of non–EU ETS firms provides an accurate coun-
terfactual estimate of how EU ETS companies would have
behaved had they not become regulated. This assumption
may be problematic in case non–EU ETS firms are also
responding to the new regulations. A more pressing con-
cern, though, is that the two groups of firms appear to be
very different even before the EU ETS. Just looking at the
patenting of these two groups reveals that while only 1 in
about 5,500 firms is EU ETS–regulated, they account for
roughly one in twelve low-carbon patents filed in the five
years before the EU ETS launched. Clearly EU ETS compa-
nies are not representative. One could quite easily imagine,
then, that some unobserved change or shock other than the
EU ETS would have had systematically different impacts on
these two sets of firms. The naive calculation above cannot
isolate the impact of EU ETS in this case.
To address this shortcoming, we need to restrict our view
to a subset of companies that are more similar on pre-2005
characteristics. For such a group of firms, it is more difficult
to imagine post-2005 changes (apart from the EU ETS) that
would have systematically different impacts on the patenting
activities of EU ETS and non–EU ETS firms. Rather than
comparing all EU ETS firms with all unregulated firms, this
more restricted comparison is likely to yield a better estimate
of the impact of the EU ETS. We now turn to the task of
constructing such a comparison.
IV. The Direct Impact of the EU ETS
A. Matching
Comparing two groups of firms that are more similar prior
to 2005 makes it more difficult to explain away any differ-
ence in outcomes by factors other than the EU ETS. Ideally
one would like to match each EU ETS firm with one or more
non–EU ETS firms with similar resources available and fac-
ing similar demand conditions, regulations (other than the
EU ETS), input prices, and so on. Because of how the EU
ETS was designed and implemented, this is at least theoret-
ically possible. Regulatory status is determined by applying
inclusion criteria to installations, not firms. For instance,
installations for which the main activity is combustion of
fuels are included only if their annual thermal input exceeds
a threshold of 20 MWh. For steel plants, the relevant inclu-
sion criterion is that installations have a production capacity
exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour. Installations manufacturing
glass and glass fiber are included only if their melting capac-
ity exceeds 20 tonnes per day. These three examples, taken
from a longer list, make clear that regulated installations
are bound to systematically differ from unregulated instal-
lations. Meanwhile, this configuration also means that what
we refer to as EU ETS and non–EU ETS firms can in prin-
ciple be identical in all respects relevant to their patenting
behavior except for the size of a single installation. This
allows us, in theory at least, to form groups of similar EU
ETS and non–EU ETS firms, although in practice, as we
restrict ourselves to more closely matched firms, there will
inevitably be a number of EU ETS companies for which no
good match can be found. What is lost in sample size, how-
ever, is regained in terms of accuracy and robustness (see,
e.g., Dehejia & Wahba, 1999).
Along with patent portfolios, our data set contains infor-
mation on the country and economic sector in which firms
operate, as well as other firm-level information such as
turnover and employment.15 Using these data, we have tried
to assign to each of the 5,568 EU ETS firms a group of
similar but unregulated firms (setting aside all companies
with ownership ties to EU ETS firms; see appendix A). This
has not always been possible, for two main reasons. First,
the records of turnover become less and less complete fur-
ther back in time. In fact, we have pre-2005 records on the
turnover for only 3,564 out of the 5,568 EU ETS firms.
Second, though EU ETS regulations were applied at the
installation level rather than directly to the firm, one might
expect two very similar firms to receive the same regulatory
treatment more than occasionally. Different regulatory fates
are possible if, say, an EU ETS firm operates an installation
just large enough to be covered by EU ETS regulations, while
the matched control operates one or more installations just
below the threshold. But although we have a very large pool
of firms to start with, sometimes there will be no such com-
parators available within the same country and sector. Due
to a lack of suitable comparators, the sample of EU ETS
firms is further reduced to 3,428. We return to the omitted
firms in section IV.C, to consider the possible consequences
of dropping them from our sample.
For each of the 3,428 matched EU ETS firms, we have
found at least one unregulated firm that operates in the same
15 Economic sectors are defined at the three-digit level for the NACE Rev. 2
industry classification. A few examples of these sector definitions illustrate
how narrowly sectors are defined: “electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution,” “steam and air conditioning supply,” “manufacture of
glass and glass products,” “manufacture of plastic products,” “manufacture
of rubber products.”
180 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Figure 4.—Comparison of Matched EU ETS and Non–EU ETS ﬁrms
Panel (a) displays the empirical quantile-quantile (e-QQ) plot for average turnover in the four years before the EU ETS (2001–2004). Each dot gives the value for one EU ETS firm and the average for a group of
matched non–EU ETS firms, shown on logarithmic scales. The year 2001 is the first one for which turnover is recorded in our data set for any firm. Panels (b) and (c) show the e-QQ plots for the total number of patents
and the number low-carbon patents from filed 2000 to 2004, respectively, once again shown on logarithmic scales.
Table 2.—Equivalence Tests for Matched EU ETS and Non–EU ETS Firms
Median Difference between Equivalence Critical Equivalence
EU ETS and Non–EU ETS Firms Range Range (5% significance level)
Turnover (in million euros) 1.60 ± 523.39 ± 13.25
Patents 0 ± 9.30 ± 1.99
Low-carbon patents 0 ± 0.25 ± 1.99
Year of incorporation 0 ± 5.97 ± 0.49
Any pre-2005 patents (binary) Exactly matched – –
Economic sector Exactly matched – –
Country Exactly matched – –
The first column from the left reports the median difference between EU ETS firms and non–EU ETS firms in our sample for the key matching variables. Apart from those variables shown in figure 4, matched on
the year of incorporation interacted with other variables, since turnover and cumulative patent filings mean different things for old and new firms. We have also matched exactly for whether (1) or not (0) a firm filed
any patents before 2005, for country of operation, and for economic sector (defined at the three-digit level for NACE Rev. 2). The empirical distributions of EU ETS and non–EU ETS characteristics are judged to be
substantively equivalent if the location shift parameter (as defined for Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test) lies within the equivalence range reported in the second column. We follow the convention of letting this range be
± 0.2 standard deviations of the distribution of the pooled sample (Cochran & Rubin, 1973; Ho et al., 2007). Using Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test, we are just unable to reject at the 5% significance level the hypothesis
that the location shift parameter lies within the critical equivalence range reported in the final column. (The signed-rank test has been adjusted to account for the fact that our variables are censored at 0, using a method
outlined by Rosenbaum, 2009. More details are in section IV). As can be seen by the fact that the range in the third column is contained within that in the second column, we can reject the hypotheses of substantive
differences for all variables except low-carbon patents. This last failure to reject is because of the small number of firms that filed any low-carbon patents prior to 2005, as is evidenced by the fact that the same test also
fails to reject the hypothesis that the difference is 0. Standard t-tests for differences in means reject the hypotheses of substantive differences for all variables (not reported).
country and economic sector. This means that they are likely
exposed to much the same business and regulatory environ-
ment, input prices, country, and sector-specific shocks and
trends. The firms are also matched to have similar pre-2005
turnover, patenting records, and age, since their available
resources and capacity for R&D and patenting are likely
important determinants of a firm’s response to the EU ETS.16
The resulting matched sample consists of 3,428 EU ETS
firms and 4,373 non–EU ETS firms.
Figure 4 compares the empirical distributions of EU ETS
and non–EU ETS firms in our matched sample on a few key
variables used to construct the match. EU ETS–regulated
firms have slightly greater pre–EU ETS turnover on aver-
age and filed slightly more patents. However, as can be
seen in table 2, we reject the hypotheses that the empiri-
cal distributions differ between the EU ETS and non–EU
ETS firms.
Because firms look similar within each match, the firms’
pre-2005 observable characteristics do not help us predict
16 See appendix B for technical details about how the matching was
implemented.
(better than chance) which firm in each matched group would
become regulated after 2005 and which firm in each group
would file more low-carbon patents. Conditional on pre–
EU ETS observable characteristics, the assignment of firms
to the EU ETS appears random. In a naive sense, we have
recovered the identifying conditions present in a randomized
experiment (though we subject this claim to further scrutiny
below).
B. Results
Perhaps the most transparent and intuitive way to view
the results is with the aid of a simple graph plotting the
patenting of matched EU ETS and non–EU ETS firms, side
by side, both before and after the EU ETS came into effect
(see figure 5). There are several noteworthy features of this
graph. First, matching appears to have produced a set of EU
ETS and non–EU ETS firms roughly comparable prior to
2005 in both their general level of low-carbon patenting and
in that they do not appear to exhibit different trends. Second,
the two groups begin to diverge after 2005, coinciding with
the introduction of the new policy.
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Figure 5.—Low-Carbon Patents by Matched EU ETS and
Non–EU ETS Firms
To examine this pattern more precisely, we measure the
change in the number of low-carbon patents from 2000–
2004 to 2005–2009 for each firm. This means that even after
matching, we take account of any additional time-invariant
firm-level heterogeneity. The outcomes of the matched con-
trol firms are then subtracted from the outcomes of the EU
ETS firms to obtain the difference-in-differences. A strik-
ing feature of the patent counts used to calculate these
difference-in-differences is the large number of zeros. It is a
very common feature of patent data that most firms do not
file any patents at all, and this arises from a similar censoring
problem that usually motivates the use of the Tobit estimator.
We can imagine there being a latent variable that can take
any value, but we can observe only numbers of 0 or greater.
To implement a Tobit estimator in our case, though, we
would have to explicitly model the propensity of firms to
file at least one patent. This is by no means a straightfor-
ward exercise, and getting the model wrong carries with it
the risk of introducing new biases. The analogous maximum
likelihood estimator will also generally be inconsistent, espe-
cially when applied to panel data (Chay & Powell, 2001).
Instead, we can account for the censoring at zero using
a Tobit-modified empirical-likelihood estimator, as Rosen-
baum (2009) outlined. The idea is as follows. We observe
the low-carbon patents filed by EU ETS firms and non–
EU ETS firms. In estimating a treatment effect, we would
normally search for a number that, if subtracted from each
of the observations in one of our two samples, would as
nearly as possible equate the distributions of the two sam-
ples (using some metric of similarity). The problem, of
course, is that this assumes a constant treatment effect that
applies even to firms with zero patents. Instead, we can adjust
our observed difference-in-differences in a way that takes
the censoring into account and then recalculate our simi-
larity measure. Each of the difference-in-differences, Δ, is




max((Tt − Tt−1) − τ, −Tt−1) − (Ct − Ct−1)
if τ ≥ 0,
(Tt − Tt−1) − max((Ct − Ct−1) + τ, −Ct−1)
otherwise
where Tt and Tt−1 are the numbers of low-carbon patents
filed by an EU ETS firm in the treatment period t (2005–
2009) and the pretreatment period t − 1 (2000–2004),
respectively. Ct and Ct−1, are the corresponding numbers
for the matched non–EU ETS firms, and τ is the treatment
effect. The point estimate of the treatment effect is then the
value of τ for which the similarity measure is maximized,
and the 100 × (100 “times” (1-alpha) gives the correct confi-
dence level) (1−α)% confidence interval is the set of values
of τ for which we cannot reject the alternative of difference
at the α% level of significance. We implement this estimator
using as our similarity measure the p-value calculated with
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test. This provides a nonparametric
alternative to the tobit estimator.
We estimate a treatment effect of τ = 2 additional low-
carbon patents for our EU ETS firms, with a 95% confidence
interval of (1, 5). The matched EU ETS firms filed 316
low-carbon patents in the period 2005 to 2009. Subtract-
ing two low-carbon patents from each of our matched EU
ETS firms (and accounting for censoring at 0) tells us that
these firms together would have filed 232 low-carbon patents
in the absence of EU ETS regulations. Our estimated treat-
ment effect therefore implies that EU ETS has prompted 84
(53, 129) additional low-carbon patents among our sample
of EU ETS firms, or an increase of 36.2% (20.2%, 69.0%)
compared to what we expect would have happened had they
not been regulated under the EU ETS. Because these firms
account for only a small portion of all patents, however, this
remarkable impact translates into an increase of low-carbon
patenting at the EPO of only 0.38% (0.24%, 0.58%) com-
pared to what we expect it would have been in the absence
of the EU ETS. If we think our estimate applies to all of the
5,568 EU ETS firms, we can use their patenting records to
calculate that once we account for censoring at 0, the EU
ETS is responsible for 183 (111, 299) additional low-carbon
patents. This amounts to a 9.1% (5.3%, 15.8%) increase
in their low-carbon patenting, or a 0.83% (0.50%, 1.36%)
increase in the total number of low-carbon patents filed at
the EPO over 2005 to 2009 compared to the counterfactual.
The first thing to note about these numbers is that they are
substantially smaller than what was suggested by our naive
calculations above (585.2 additional low-carbon patents, or a
2.6% increase in low-carbon patents at the EPO; see table 3).
Second, because these numbers are so small relative to the
totals, it is likely we would not have recognized the impact
to be anything different from 0, had we been studying patent
counts at a more aggregated level.
To address the issue of the direction of technological
change, we must compare this with the impact on patent-
ing for other technologies. Environmental regulations like
the EU ETS could in principle increase patenting for other
technologies as well. For instance, even if they are not classi-
fied as low-carbon technologies, they may be complementary
to low-carbon technologies. More generally, environmental
regulations that increase the cost of production can in prin-
ciple encourage patenting for any technology that reduces it,
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Additional low-carbon patents 84 183 585.2
(53,129) (111,299)
As % increase 36.2 9.1 36.5
(20.2, 69.0) (5.3, 15.8)
As % increase of EPO 0.38 0.83 2.6
(0.24, 0.58) (0.50, 1.36)
Additional other patents 305 551 9,072.8
(305, 512.9) (551, 934)
As % increase 1.9 0.83 16.0
(1.9, 3.2) (0.83, 1.44)
As % increase of EPO 0.041 0.072 1.2
(0.041, 0.068) (0.072, 0.12)
Point estimates, along with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses where applicable. The matched
sample estimates consider the impact only for the 3,426 matched EU ETS firms, while full sample estimates
consider the impact for all 5,568 EU ETS firms in our data set. The matching estimates are calculated
using our point estimates of τ obtained for the matched sample of 3,426 EU ETS firms and 4,373 non–EU
ETS firms. Naive estimates are included for comparison. They have been calculated using the full set of
30 million non–EU ETS firms to construct a counterfactual, as in section III.
be it a low-carbon technology or not.17 The induced innova-
tion hypothesis holds that a policy like the EU ETS would
have a disproportionate impact on low-carbon technologies,
but this is an essentially empirical matter. A related concern
is that the increase in low-carbon innovation will displace,
or crowd out, the development of other technologies (Popp
& Newell, 2012). We can address these questions using the
same matched sample and estimator described above. We
estimate that the EU ETS has added on average one other
patent (1, 1.99). This translates into 305 (305, 512.9) addi-
tional patents for other technologies, which represents an
increase of 1.9% (1.9%, 3.2%) in their patent filings for non-
low-carbon technologies, or a 0.041% (0.041%, 0.068%)
increase in patenting for other technologies at the EPO. Com-
paring these numbers with the estimates from the previous
paragraph, we see that the EU ETS has had a disproportion-
ate impact on patenting for low-carbon technologies: 36.2%
versus 1.9% (the difference is significant at 5% level). Put
another way, the system has nearly had a twenty times greater
impact on low-carbon patenting, but it has not crowded out
patenting for other technologies. If we think our estimate
applies to all of the 5,568 EU ETS firms, the EU ETS would
be responsible for 541 (541, 934) additional other patents,
which amounts to a 0.83% (0.83%, 1.44%) increase in their
other patenting, or a 0.072% (0.072%, 0.12%) increase in
the total number of other patents filed at the EPO over 2005
to 2009.
17 Apart from technological complementarity and cost minimization, firms
might fear that the EU ETS will make them less competitive, and hence
innovate more across the board to maintain market share. Alternatively, the
windfall profits that were earned from the free allowances may have eased
pressure from shareholders, so it became easier for EU ETS firms to invest
in previously sidelined research projects. One can, of course, imagine still
other mechanisms whereby a price on carbon increases patenting for other
technologies. The main point here is only that economic theory does not
rule it out.
The EU ETS may also have affected the direction of
change within the class of low-carbon technologies itself,
encouraging more patenting for certain types of low-carbon
technologies. Unfortunately, our firm-level identification
strategy is ill suited to look at patenting at such a disag-
gregated level. Due to the large number of zeros typically
present in patent data sets, the small number of regulated
companies active in each sectors and the even smaller num-
ber of patents each firm holds in a particular technology
class, this method does not yield informative technology-
level estimates. However, once we have estimated that each
EU ETS firm filed two additional low-carbon patents, it is
a small step to consider what types of technologies those
patents protect (i.e., conditional on the estimated treatment
effect). Since firms often hold several patents protecting
different technologies, there is no definite way of identi-
fying which two low-carbon patents were additional. If we
look at the average across all possible permutations, how-
ever, we find that most of the additional low-carbon patents
appear to protect alternative energy and energy storage. The
focus of the remaining ones is on energy efficiency and car-
bon sequestration. Alternative energy technologies appear
to account for a greater number of additional low-carbon
patents than do improvements of conventional combustion
technologies. Broken down by economic sector, most of the
additional low-carbon patents belong to chemicals manu-
facturers, energy companies, and automobile manufacturers
(see appendix D for further explanation of the methodology,
as well as for all the technology- and sector-level estimates).
These stylized conclusions should be read more as indicative
than final, though, and since they are conditional on our esti-
mated treatment effect, their soundness ultimately depends
on the robustness of our earlier estimates.
Our main results are summarized for convenience in
table 3, along with comparable naive estimates for the full
sample of EU ETS firms (calculated as in section III). The
naive estimates substantially overestimate the impact of the
EU ETS, yet they display the same general pattern as our
matching estimates, showing increases in patenting for both
low-carbon and other technologies, but with a pronounced
direction. The matching estimates suggest the EU ETS has
had a positive and notable impact on low-carbon patent-
ing among EU ETS firms, though the impact appears much
smaller relative to the overall pace of low-carbon technolog-
ical development, boosting low-carbon patenting by only a
fraction of a percent. On the one hand, our findings contra-
dict early prognostications that overallocation of emissions
permits in the EU ETS would completely undermine the
incentives for low-carbon innovation. On the other hand,
even a quite remarkable response among EU ETS firms—
whether 36.2% among matched EU ETS firms or 9.1%
among the full sample—translates into a rather small impact
from an economy-wide perspective, less than a 1% increase
at the EPO. Putting it another way, of the post-2005 surge
in low-carbon patenting seen in figure 1, roughly 2% can
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Figure 6.—Comparison of Matched EU ETS and Non–EU ETS Firms on
Unobserved Variable
be attributed to the EU ETS.18 It is worth noting that this
apparently small impact relative to the overall pace of tech-
nological change is not simply an arithmetical artifact of the
small number of EU ETS firms, however, as is demonstrated
by the fact that the naive estimator is more than three times
higher.
Before settling on an interpretation of these estimates,
though, we must ask whether they are really best explained
by the EU ETS having had a very small impact. Perhaps
these small numbers should instead caution us that we may
have underestimated the impact. Let us therefore investigate
challenges to the internal and external validity of our results.
C. Robustness Tests
Is our conclusion driven by an omitted variable? The
primary challenge for any matching study is to justify the
assumption that firms that appear similar are similar in
unmeasured dimensions as well—often called selection on
observables. In a randomized experiment, one can rely on the
law of large numbers to achieve similarity between a treated
and control group on both observed and unobserved charac-
teristics. Matching, on the other hand, achieves an observed
similarity by construction, so similarity on matched char-
acteristics cannot be read as evidence that the treated and
control firms are also similar on unobserved characteristics.
A simple test of whether matching has achieved balance
on unobserved variables is to look at a variable that was not
used to construct the matches. We have one such variable in
our data set: the number of employees. As figure 6 and table 4
show, the empirical distributions of number of employees of
the EU ETS and non–EU ETS firms are very similar, and
18 The number of low-carbon patents filed at the EPO increased by 9,054
from the period 2000–2004 to 2005–2009. The 183 additional low-carbon
patents we have attributed to the EU ETS correspond to 2% of this increase.
Even under the more generous framing that the upward trend from 2000–
2004 would have continued unabated in 2005–2009, the post-2005 surge
was only 4,725.5 low-carbon patents, of which the 183 additional low-
carbon patents would amount to barely 4%.
Table 4.—Equivalence Test for Matched EU ETS and Non–EU ETS
Firms on Unobserved Variable
Median Difference
between Critical Equivalence
EU ETS and Equivalence Range (5% significance
Non–EU ETS Firms Range level)
Employees 25 ± 904.07 ± 106.75
See the table 2 footnote for details on how to read this table.
we can reject the hypothesis that they are materially differ-
ent. We can therefore have some confidence that matching
has indeed recovered the central identifying condition of a
randomized experiment.
This test, though reassuring, is perhaps too simplistic.
Other unobserved differences between regulated and unreg-
ulated firms might still bias our findings. Such differences
might arise, for instance, if firms could influence to some
degree whether they would be regulated by the EU ETS. In
general, there is very little evidence to suggest that firms
had such influence; most of the installation-level inclusion
criteria already appeared in draft legislation in 2002 and
have remained unchanged to this day. One small exception,
though, is the debate over whether to regulate installations
that produce chemicals or aluminum. These types of installa-
tions were to be regulated according to the 2002 proposal but
were omitted from a later draft, before a final compromise
that allowed chemicals and aluminum installations to opt in
to the EU ETS (Markussen & Svendsen, 2005). Ultimately,
575 such installations—slightly less than 5% of all EU ETS
installations—opted in. Our estimates might be biased, then,
if the firms with chemicals or aluminum installations that are
opting into the EU ETS are systematically different from
their non–EU ETS counterparts in some unobserved dimen-
sion that is predictive of patenting responses. To see whether
our estimates are biased by the possibility of self-selection
in this subset of firms, we re-estimate the treatment effect
after dropping any matched pairs where the EU ETS firm
has opted in at least one of its installations (this reduces our
sample size by nearly 100 matched pairs). This returns an
estimate of 2 (1, 5.99) additional low-carbon patents, and
of 1 (1, 1.99) other additional patent. These estimates are
identical to our original specification (although one of the
confidence intervals is slightly wider), offering no indication
that our estimates are biased by self-selection.
The two above tests look at specific sources of omitted
variable bias. Neither test finds evidence to suggest that our
estimates are biased by variable omissions, but the possibil-
ity remains that our estimates are confounded by bias from
some unknown source. Let us therefore ask the more general
question: What kind of an omitted variable could in principle
undermine confidence in our estimate?
Imagine that we have an omitted binary variable that is
negatively correlated with EU ETS regulations and positively
correlated with increases in low-carbon patenting (or vice
versa). This could be, for instance, a variable that tells us
whether a firm would be covered by a complementary carbon
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policy that targets the types of firms unlikely to be regulated
by the EU ETS. Omitting such a variable would cause us to
underestimate the impact of the EU ETS. Using the model
for sensitivity analysis developed by Rosenbaum (1987) and
Rosenbaum and Silber (2009), we can infer precisely how
large the omitted variable bias would have to be in order to
undermine confidence in our estimate relative to some larger
alternative.
In order for our 3,428 matched EU ETS firms to have
boosted the number of low-carbon patents filed at the EPO by
5%, say, they would have to have filed 1,062 additional low-
carbon patents. Since they did not file this many low-carbon
patents over 2005 to 2009 in total, we can comfortably rule
out that the EU ETS would have had such a large treatment
effect even if all of the patents were additional. To have
boosted low-carbon patents by just 1%, 223 of their low-
carbon patents would have to have been additional. This
translates back into a treatment effect of τ = 20.4—more
than ten times higher than our original estimate. In order
to increase our point estimate beyond this level, we would
have to postulate an omitted variable that, if observed before
2005, would successfully predict more than 83 times out of
a 100 (a) which firm in our matched pairs escapes EU ETS
regulations and (b) which firm in our matched pairs would
most increase their low-carbon patenting. Even if the omit-
ted variable made prediction (a) almost perfectly, it would
still have to predict (b) 73 times out of 100. For the milder
threshold of just being unable to reject the hypothesis that the
the treatment effect is 20.4, we would still have to postulate
an omitted variable that makes these prediction successfully
more than 70 times out of 100.19 We have estimated above
that our sample of matched EU ETS firms accounts for only
a 0.38% increase in low-carbon patenting at the EPO. If
one finds an example of a complementary policy that was
implemented in such a systematic fashion across the EU and
caused such a predictable boost in the low-carbon patent-
ing, we would have to concede that they may have boosted
low-carbon patenting by as much as 1%. Even then, it is
not obvious that this would seriously challenge the conclu-
sion that the EU ETS has had but a limited direct impact on
low-carbon patenting overall.
Another category of potential omitted variables are those
generally expected to be positively correlated with both a
firm’s chances of becoming regulated and their chances of
increasing their low-carbon patenting. Examples include, for
instance, whether a firm had high or low carbon emissions
prior to 2005, or a complementary carbon policy that targets
the same types of firms regulated under the EU ETS. The
omission of a variable with these properties would imply
we have overestimated the impact of the EU ETS above. To
reduce our point estimate to 0, we would need to postulate
19 In Rosenbaum’s notation, it is just possible that the estimated treatment
effect is 20.4 for a sensitivity parameter of Γ = 2.65, and we are just unable
to reject this treatment effect at the 5% significance level for Γ = 1.4. This
can be decomposed into the biases present in treatment assignment and
outcomes using propositions in Rosenbaum and Silber (2009).
an omitted variable that predicts more than 81 times out of
100 (a) which firm in our matched pairs became EU ETS–
regulated and (b) which firm in our matched pairs would
most increase their low-carbon patenting. It would need to
make these predictions successfully more than 71 times out
of 100 to make us just unable to reject at the 5% level the
hypothesis that the treatment effect is really 0.20 In appendix
E, we examine two suggested omitted variables—company
growth rates and the number of innovation locations—but
neither predicts a firm’s EU ETS status well enough to
challenge our conclusions.21
In sum, matching has achieved balance on at least one
unobserved characteristic, which might suggest it has bal-
anced other unobserved variables as well, as a truly random-
ized experiment would have. Even if this is not the case,
though, it appears that our estimate of the low-carbon treat-
ment effect is reasonably robust to both negative and positive
omitted variable biases.
Are the estimates valid beyond our sample? A more
serious challenge to our conclusion, perhaps, is to justify
extrapolating from our sample of 3,428 EU ETS firms to
all EU ETS firms. This type of calculation might lead us to
underestimate the impact of the EU ETS if the firms omitted
from estimation have had a systematically stronger reaction
compared to those firms in our sample. This is a question of
selection bias.
The first thing to look at is whether the EU ETS firms
we have matched successfully exhibited substantially dif-
ferent patenting behavior prior to 2005 from the EU ETS
firms dropped from our matched sample. An unmatched EU
ETS firm would have been dropped either because it was an
outlier or because crucial data were missing that prevented
matching. In practice, most were dropped because financial
data were missing. This has two consequences. First, we
can reliably compare the patenting behavior of matched and
unmatched EU ETS firms. Second, there may be substantial
overlap in the levels of patenting of matched and unmatched
EU ETS firms. Keeping in mind that some proportion of
the unmatched EU ETS firms are probably outliers, though,
matched EU ETS firms are likely to have slightly lower
patenting levels on average.
Let us apply the same procedure used in table 2 to compare
matched EU ETS and non–EU ETS firms.22 For low-carbon
patenting, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the empiri-
cal distributions of matched and unmatched EU ETS firms
are different, although we can reject at the 5% level of sig-
nificance the hypothesis that the two distributions differ by
a shift parameter greater than ±1.99 (equivalence range:
±0.72; critical equivalence range for 5% significance level:
20 In Rosenbaum’s notation, it is just possible that the estimated treatment
effect is 0 for a sensitivity parameter of Γ = 2.34, and we are just unable
to reject this treatment effect at the 5% significance level for Γ = 1.45.
21 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion.
22 Since matched and unmatched EU ETS firms are not paired, we here
substitute Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test for the signed-rank test.
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±1.99). This mirrors our findings in table 2 and follows
in part from the relative rarity of low-carbon patents. For
other patents, we can reject the hypothesis that the empirical
distributions are substantively different (equivalence range:
±34.52; critical equivalence range for 5% significance level:
±1.99). The sectoral composition is somewhat different for
matched and unmatched EU ETS firms, but all economic sec-
tors with at least a handful of unmatched EU ETS firms are
also well represented among our matched firms, including in
the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
sector. Naturally, matched and unmatched EU ETS firms are
not identical. If they were, we would have been able to match
them all in the first place (apart from where data was miss-
ing). Nevertheless, our tests here suggest that unmatched EU
ETS firms do not appear to be substantially different from
the EU ETS firms in our matched sample, which is perhaps
reassuring for our earlier attempt to extrapolate.
This may not entirely allay concern that matched and
unmatched EU ETS firms have had systematically differ-
ent reactions to the EU ETS. Maybe there was selection on
some other relevant variable that we are unable to check.
We can address this concern in three ways: (a) increasing
the sample size by matching some of those unmatched EU
ETS firms, (b) calculating an upper bound for our estimates,
and (c) calculating a lower bound for the out-of-sample
response necessary to qualitatively affect our conclusions.
First, because turnover figures become more widely avail-
able in 2005, we are able to increase sample size if we
allow ourselves to use 2005 turnover figures to construct the
matches. This is not generally desirable, because the EU ETS
might have affected 2005 turnover, which in turn had some
effect on low-carbon patenting. If this is the case, the match-
ing estimate using 2005 turnover would be biased because
it omits this channel. However, because using 2005 turnover
gives us access to a greater number of EU ETS and non–EU
ETS firms, it may still provide a reasonable test of whether
our findings apply to the EU ETS more broadly.
Matching using 2005 turnover figures allows us to suc-
cessfully match an additional 427 EU ETS firms, producing
3,855 matched groups in total. The point estimates for this
sample are 2.75 (1, 5.99) for low-carbon patents and 1
(1, 1.99) for other patents, almost identical to our original
estimates. The typical matched firm still looks much the
same, which is what one would expect if we were simply
finding more firms around the same EU ETS thresholds.
The EU ETS firms in our original matched sample therefore
appear to be representative of a larger portion of the EU ETS.
On the other hand, it also means that this rematch does not
so much help address concerns that the EU ETS is affect-
ing low-carbon patenting among the atypical companies for
which suitable unregulated matches could not be found the
first time around.
It is nevertheless possible to bound the effect that these
atypical firms can have on the impact estimates. Suppose
we were able to perfectly match every one of the 2,140
EU ETS firms we were forced to omit. Suppose further
that the hypothetically matched non–EU ETS firms have not
filed any patents since 2005, a strict lower bound. Because
we observe the low-carbon patenting of the EU ETS firms,
these two assumptions allow us to calculate the upper-bound
difference-in-differences for each of these 2,140 EU ETS
firms. Pooling them with the 3,428 previous difference-in-
differences, we can then estimate the upper bound of the
treatment effect.23 This procedure produces point estimates
of 13 (3.01, 39.99) for low-carbon and 5.75 (4, 10.99) for
other patents. These high point estimates are driven in large
part by a small number of prolific patenters that were previ-
ously omitted but are now matched to hypothetical non–EU
ETS firms with 0 patents after 2005. Subtracting a large num-
ber of patents from each firm and accounting for censoring at
0 therefore does not add as many patents as the higher point
estimates perhaps might suggest. The new estimates trans-
late into 500 (230.37, 866.9) additional low-carbon patents
and 2,005.75 (1,558, 3,144.95) additional other patents, or
increases of 29.6 (11.8%, 65.6%) and 3.1% (2.4%, 5.0%)
respectively. While there is still a clear direction to induced
technological change, it is less pronounced than for our
original estimates. In comparison with the total numbers of
patents that would otherwise have been filed at the EPO in
each category in this period, the additional patents represent
a 2.3% (1.0%, 4.0%) increase in low-carbon patenting and a
0.26% (0.21%, 0.42%) increase in patenting for other tech-
nologies. In economic terms, the upper bounds are perhaps
slightly more noteworthy than our original estimates, though
we are now very aware of the kind of extremely favorable
and unrealistic assumptions needed to generate such results.
Our third strategy to address concerns about external
validity is to calculate what out-of-sample response would
be necessary in order to qualitatively affect our conclusion.
Our sample covers 9,358 out of the 12,122 installations that
fell under EU ETS regulation in 2005 (see table 1). In order
for the EU ETS to have boosted low-carbon patenting by 5%,
say, EU ETS firms together would have to have filed 1,062
additional low-carbon patents over 2005 to 2009. Subtracting
our best estimate of 183 additional low-carbon patents for the
5,568 firms operating 9,358 EU ETS installations, this leaves
the operators of the remaining 2,764 installations to have
filed 879 additional low-carbon patents. To put it another
way, we estimate that the average EU ETS firm in our sam-
ple filed roughly 0.03 extra low-carbon patents, but even if
the remaining 2,764 were operated by as many firms (another
charitable assumption), the EU ETS firms outside our sample
would have to have filed 0.32 additional low-carbon patents
in the same period. The out-of-sample response would have
to be ten times greater than the in-sample response. Even
if we use the upper-bound estimate (in-sample firms filed
500 additional low-carbon patents), the out-of-sample firms
would have to have filed 562 extra low-carbon patents, or at
23 This bound is analogous to the sharp bounds derived by Manski (2007)
for situations with missing data. The bound is sharp in the sense that it does
not impose any restrictions on the process that leads to “missingness.”
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least 0.2 per firm, which is still more than twice the upper
bound for our in-sample firms (0.09). These strong responses
appear especially unlikely in light of the fact that most of the
out-of-sample firms operate in countries with lower patent-
ing propensities (Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and
Slovenia).
It therefore seems that none of the strategies to address
concerns about external validity—increasing sample size,
computing upper bounds, and calculating necessary out-of-
sample responses—seriously challenge our earlier conclu-
sion. The EU ETS appears to have had a positive and notable
impact on low-carbon patenting among EU ETS firms, but
partly because these firms account for a small proportion of
low-carbon patents, the direct impact on low-carbon techno-
logical change has been much more limited on a European
scale.
Other robustness tests. We have tried to address the most
pertinent challenges to our interpretation of the results, but
one can imagine still other explanations for why the direct
impact of the EU ETS appears to have been so small. We
have tried to test several of these:
• Are matched non–EU ETS firms also responding to EU
ETS? If so, firms less exposed to the EU ETS and to
direct competition with EU ETS firms would perhaps
be expected to respond less. We rematched our EU
ETS firms to similar firms in Norway, Switzerland, Bul-
garia, and Romania (four countries that did not launch
the EU ETS in 2005 and two of which have remained
outside). We also rematched our EU ETS firms to sim-
ilar U.S. firms. Neither comparison returns an estimate
of the treatment effect significantly different from that
reported above (see appendix E for further details).
• Did the main patenting response occur after the directive
was adopted in 2003 but before the EU ETS launched
in 2005? Some authors have highlighted the possibil-
ity that firms patent in anticipation of new regulations
(Dekker et al., 2012). To address this concern, we
rematched our EU ETS firms using 2003 as the treat-
ment year instead of 2005. The treatment effect for
the period 2003 to 2004 indicates that prospective EU
ETS firms would actually have filed 1.75 additional
low-carbon patents if not for the EU ETS, though the
number is not significantly different from zero. In other
words, there is no significant difference in the low-
carbon patenting activities of EU ETS and non–EU ETS
firms in this period.
• Is the result an artifact of how we measure low-
carbon patents? To address this, we looked at using
an expanded definition of low-carbon patents. This does
not materially affect our conclusions. Nemet (2009) and
Hoppmann et al. (2013) raise a related concern—that
a policy like the EU ETS might discourage non-
incremental innovation (more likely to be counted as
high-value patents). However, we do not find evidence
Table 5.—Summary of Treatment Effect Estimates
Low-Carbon Other
Original estimate 2 1
(1, 5) (1, 1.99)
Alternative specifications
Excluding opt-ins 2 1
(1, 5.99) (1, 1.99)
Matching with 2005 turnover 2.75 1
(1, 5.99) (1, 1.99)
Expanded low-carbon definition 1.75 1
(1, 3.99) (1, 1.99)
Non–EU ETS firms from Norway, 1 2
Switzerland, Romania, and Bulgaria (0, 1.99) (1, 3)
Non–EU ETS firms from United States −1 0
(−1.99, 0.99) (−0.99, 0.99)
Treatment years 2003–2004 −1.75 −1
(−∞, 1.99) (−4, −0.01)
Upper bounds
Assuming 1% boost to EPO 20.4 –
Low-carbon patenting – –
Assuming all patents of unmatched 13 5.75
EU ETS firms are additional (3.01, 39.99) (4, 10.99)
that the quality of patents held by EU ETS firms (mea-
sured by citations and family size) has changed relative
to non–EU ETS firms (see appendix E for more details).
• Is there some other hidden bias? Perhaps we are only
picking up the low-carbon technology component of a
broader trend toward environmental technologies going
on among our EU ETS firms. We look at the number
of patents filed by matched EU ETS and non–EU ETS
firms protecting other pollution control technologies,
as defined by Popp (2006). Since these technologies
do not help mitigate emissions covered under the EU
ETS, we would not expect the EU ETS to have had
any impact. A hidden bias in our study design, perhaps
some unknown omitted variable, would manifest itself
as finding a treatment effect here that is significantly
different from zero. Our estimated treatment effect is
τ = 0.75, but it is not significantly different from 0.24
For convenience, table 5 summarizes the results from
robustness tests that involved reestimating the treatment
effect under alternative assumptions. More information and
a few additional robustness tests can be found in appendix E.
It appears, then, that EU ETS has had a positive and
notable impact on low-carbon patenting among EU ETS
firms. It has spurred development of low-carbon technolo-
gies without crowding out innovation for other technologies.
Since EU ETS firms account for only a small proportion
of low-carbon patents, however, the impact on EU ETS–
regulated firms is negligible on a European scale. None of
the above challenges seems to offer a compelling alternative
explanation to this interpretation of the results.25
24 Roughly 20% of EPO patents classified as one of Popp’s pollution con-
trol technologies also fall into the low-carbon category. Excluding these,
however, does not substantively affect the outcome.
25 One must be careful also because some of the tests we have used to inves-
tigate these alternative explanations, though addressing one potential source
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If we accept that the impact of the EU ETS on regulated
firms does not account for the post-2005 surge in low-carbon
patenting seen in figure 1, might the EU ETS still be indi-
rectly responsible? Has it encouraged third parties to develop
low-carbon technologies in the hope of selling or licensing
them to newly regulated EU ETS firms? We investigate this
question next.
V. The Indirect Impact of the EU ETS
The preceding analysis strongly suggests that the direct
impact of the EU ETS has not been sufficient to account
for the apparent surge in low-carbon patenting since 2005.
Could the impact of the EU ETS instead have been largely
indirect, spurring third parties to develop new low-carbon
technologies?
There are three major reasons that we would expect
the indirect impact to be comparatively small. First, since
technology providers cannot perfectly appropriate the gains
from their technologies, economic theory predicts that envi-
ronmental regulations would produce greater incentives to
develop new technologies for directly regulated firms than
for third parties (Milliman & Prince, 1989; Fischer et al.,
2003). The asymmetry arises because the latter group is not
discharging costly emissions themselves and receive no addi-
tional benefit reducing its own compliance cost. To the extent
that the EU ETS is encouraging low-carbon technological
change, therefore, economic theory predicts this response to
be strongest among EU ETS firms.
Second, EU ETS firms have filed over 120,000 patents
with the EPO since 2000; approximately 2.5% of them pro-
tect low-carbon technologies. These are clearly firms with
above-average innovation capabilities. To argue that the bulk
of the response to the EU ETS comes from third-party tech-
nology providers amounts to saying that these EU ETS firms
with well-developed low-carbon innovation capabilities are
responding mostly by purchasing technologies from others
rather than developing the technologies in-house to suit their
own specific needs.
Third, the EU ETS firms in our sample are very likely
technology providers themselves. As highlighted in the pre-
vious paragraph, EU ETS firms do develop new technologies
themselves, including low-carbon technologies. While some
firms may innovate in the hope of meeting new demand
from EU ETS firms, others might expect greater opportu-
nities to purchase the technologies developed by EU ETS
firms. The indirect impact of the EU ETS is the net of these
two responses.
These three reasons suggest that the indirect impact of
the EU ETS would be comparatively small, but all claims
of bias, may introduce new biases of their own (e.g., using 2005 turnover
figures). The point here, however, is that to replicate our results each time,
the new bias would have to be of the same sign and magnitude as the
hypothesized bias in the original match. This explanation becomes increas-
ingly unlikely with each new test, and the explanation that our estimate is
unbiased appears more likely by comparison.
about the indirect effect need to be met with the same level
of skepticism as any other empirical hypothesis. It is a very
difficult task to cleanly estimate the indirect impact of the
EU ETS, not least because of the difficulty involved in iden-
tifying firms more likely to either provide new technologies
to EU ETS firms or to which EU ETS firms are more likely
to provide new technologies. We can nevertheless make a
start.
Consider the set of firms that had filed at least one patent
jointly with an EU ETS firm prior to 2005. A joint patent
filing records a technological partnership with an EU ETS
firm. One might then expect these firms to be more likely
than an average non–EU ETS firm to either provide technolo-
gies to EU ETS firms once the regulations came into force
or demand new technologies from EU ETS firms. They are
likely to be good candidates for studying the indirect impact
of the EU ETS. By comparing this set of firms with other
non–EU ETS firms, we might hope to gain at least some par-
tial insight as to the net indirect impact of the EU ETS. It is
worth noting, though, that while technology provision is an
asymmetric relationship, co-patenting is of course symmet-
ric. Hence, we cannot separate co-patenters into technology
providers and purchasers even if each co-patenter could in
principle be classified as one or the other. Nevertheless, we
can provide an indicative estimate of the net indirect impact
of the EU ETS.
From patent records we can identify 11,603 non–EU ETS
firms that each filed at least one patent jointly with an EU
ETS firm over 1978 to 2004. Many of these firms are no
longer active or operate in countries not in our data set,
which prevents us from matching them. Additionally, as
before, there are many firms for which historical data are
missing, and a few for which we simply cannot find suitable
comparators. Our matched sample therefore contains 2,784
co-patenters and 19,361 similar firms that had not filed a
joint patent with an EU ETS firm prior to 2005.26 Figure 7
and table 6 show the properties of our matched sample.27
We estimate a treatment effect of τ = 0.99 additional
low-carbon patents among our co-patenters, with a 95%
confidence interval of (−0.99, 1.99). We cannot say with
confidence, therefore, that the EU ETS has had any net
impact on the low-carbon patenting of co-patenters. Even
taking the point estimate at face value, it translates into
a mere 47.52 additional low-carbon patents. Although it
would represent a quite dramatic response, on the order of a
32.4% increase compared to the counterfactual, it would still
translate into a negligible increase relative to the number of
low-carbon patents filed at the EPO (0.2%). Extrapolating
the number to all 11,603 co-patenters would naturally make
26 Compared to when EU ETS firms were matched earlier, finding a single
good comparator here was a good indicator that there were many good
comparators available. We have kept all of these comparators in our matched
sample to reduce the variance of our estimates.
27 On average, co-patenters have historically filed more patents than EU
ETS firms. It is no mystery why: to be a co-patenter, a firm must have filed at
least one patent prior to 2005, while EU ETS firms had no such requirement
to meet.
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Figure 7.—Comparison of Matched Co-Patenters and Non–Co-Patenting Firms
Table 6.—Equivalence Tests for Matched Co-Patenters and Non-Co-Patenting Firms
Median Difference between Equivalence Critical Equivalence
EU ETS and Non–EU ETS Firms Range Range (5% significance level)
Turnover (in thousands of euros) 14.90 ± 304,382.80 ± 1,421.00
Patents 0 ± 7.07 ± < 0.01
Low-carbon patents 0 ± 0.17 ± 0.99
Year of incorporation 0 ± 5.48 ± 0.50
Any pre-2005 patents (binary) Exactly matched – –
Economic sector Exactly matched – –
Country Exactly matched – –
Employees 1.66 ± 1,613.82 ± 20.66
See the table 2 footnote for details on how to read this table. Again, the failure to reject the hypothesis of difference for low-carbon patents is a consequence of the small number of firms that filed any low-carbon
patents prior to 2005. The same test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the difference is 0. Standard t-tests for differences in means reject the hypotheses of substantive differences for all variables (not reported). For
completeness, the results from the robustness test of checking balance on employees are also included at the bottom of this table.
it look as if the EU ETS has had a more impressive indirect
impact, but since the estimate does not even stand up to a
conventional significance test, such an exercise is not likely
to be informative.
The picture is not much different for other technologies
either. We estimate that the EU ETS has on average sub-
tracted 0.745 other patents (−0.99, −0.01) for co-patenters.
We are just barely able to reject the hypothesis that the
effect is actually 0, but this rejection does not withstand even
the slightest challenge to robustness. Moreover, even if the
point estimate were true, it would suggest that the EU ETS
has crowded out patenting for non-low-carbon technologies
among co-patenters.
These numbers offer no compelling evidence that the
EU ETS has had an indirect impact on patenting. A patent
filed jointly with an EU ETS firm is a record of a techno-
logical partnership, be it the case that the co-patenter has
provided technologies to EU ETS firms or vice versa. In
either case, one would expect that co-patenters are more
likely than an average non–EU ETS firm to supply new tech-
nologies to EU ETS firms or to demand new technologies
from EU ETS firms once the EU ETS launched. Yet, taken
together, co-patenters appear to behave no different from
other non–EU ETS firms. It is of course incredibly difficult
to identify potential technology providers and demanders
for the purposes of estimation, so our results should not be
overinterpreted. Nevertheless, our findings can perhaps be
read as a reasonable indication that the EU ETS has had no
net indirect impact on directed technological change. At the
very least, it poses an empirical challenge for those wishing
to argue otherwise.
VI. Discussion
The EU ETS launched in 2005 amid promises and pes-
simism. An important objective of carbon market programs
like the EU ETS is to encourage the development of low-
carbon technologies (Stavins, 2007; European Commission,
2005, 2012). In this paper we have investigated the system’s
success in this regard during the five years subsequent to its
launch.
A casual look at aggregate patenting suggests there has
been an increase in low-carbon patenting since 2005, but
there are several obstacles to isolating the impact of the
EU ETS. Comparing patenting behavior prior to and after
2005 risks conflating the impact of the EU ETS with other
changes, like rapidly rising oil prices. Yet looking only at
the period after 2005 and comparing EU ETS–regulated
firms with those that escaped regulation risks conflating the
impact of the EU ETS with other systematic differences in
firm characteristics that might also drive patenting. Employ-
ing a matched difference-in-differences study design has
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permitted us to account for firm-level time-invariant hetero-
geneity and to isolate that part of the change that does not
depend on systematic differences in firm characteristics.
We find evidence that the EU ETS has had a strong impact
on the patenting behavior of EU ETS–regulated firms. Our
best estimate for a sample of 3,428 EU ETS firms implies
that the system has increased their low-carbon patenting by
36.2% compared to what we expect would have happened
had they not been regulated under the EU ETS. What is more,
our estimates suggest that the system has also encouraged
EU ETS firms to increase their patent filings for non-low-
carbon technologies by 1.9%. The EU ETS thus appears to
have had a disproportionate impact on patenting for low-
carbon technologies, but it has not crowded out patenting
for other technologies.
Extrapolating our point estimates to 5,568 EU ETS firms
across eighteen countries, the EU ETS would account for a
9.1% increase in low-carbon patenting and a 0.83% increase
in patenting for other technologies. Because of the targeted
nature of EU ETS regulations, however, these responses
translate into a quite unremarkable nudge on the pace and
direction of technological change—a 0.38% boost to low-
carbon patenting at the EPO (0.83% for the full sample) and
a meager 0.041% boost to patenting for other technologies
(0.072% for the full sample). We should nevertheless remain
cognizant of the fact that patent counts tend to emphasize
technological changes and do not fully reflect the develop-
ment of new operational strategies or capital investments and
divestments as they relate to already available technologies.
Other measures may provide a better understanding of the
System’s impact on other such aspects of innovation.
To test whether our focus on EU ETS firms blinkered us
to the System’s broader effects, we have also attempted to
estimate the indirect impact of the EU ETS. To this end,
we have compared non–EU ETS firms with at least one
patent jointly filed with an EU ETS firm, with otherwise
similar non–EU ETS firms. Although we can provide only
indicative estimates, we find no compelling evidence that
the EU ETS has had either a net positive or net negative
impact on the patent filings of potential technology providers
and purchasers. If data on patent licensing agreements could
be obtained, researchers in the future may be able to study
questions like this in greater detail.
Our findings suggest a way to reconcile the findings of
the broader empirical literature on environmental policy and
directed technological change. Several studies of the impacts
of inclusive standards and energy or pollution taxes find
evidence that environmental policy does indeed encourage
directed technological change (Lanjouw & Mody, 1996;
Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2002, 2003, 2006;
Arimura et al., 2007; Lanoie et al., 2007). In contrast, studies
of previous emissions trading programs, like the U.S. Acid
Rain Program, at best unearth evidence of very small impacts
on directed technological change (Popp, 2003; Lange & Bel-
las, 2005). Our results indicate that the discrepancy between
the findings of cap-and-trade studies and studies of other
instruments may be a consequence not of weaker innova-
tion incentives provided by emissions trading instruments,
but of the fact that they tend to concern a comparatively
small number of firms. The impact on these firms may in
fact be quite large, even in the EU ETS where permits in the
initial trading phases were very likely overallocated. When
their response is compared to the overall pace of techno-
logical change, however, the effect appears negligible. Our
estimates at the aggregate level are consistent with the weak
effects found in the empirical literature on cap-and-trade pro-
grams, but our firm-level estimates provide additional detail.
The weak aggregate effect is an average of the nonreaction
of a large number of firms that are more or less unaffected
by the program and the strong reaction of a small group of
regulated firms. Someone studying the impact of an emis-
sions trading program by looking only at patenting records
at a more aggregated level is effectively pooling together
these two groups of firms and is therefore likely to over-
look the program’s strong but targeted effect. Conversely, the
impact of more inclusive environmental policies, like energy
and pollution taxes, may be more easily detected because
these policies affect so many firms, even if the change in
behavior for each firm is quite small. Debates about the rel-
ative costs and benefits of different environmental policy
instruments already consider the impacts on pace and direc-
tion technological change of central importance (Kneese &
Schultze, 1975; Pizer & Popp, 2008). Our results, read in
combination with the findings of the broader literature, sug-
gest that environmental policy instruments may differ also in
the distribution of impacts on directed technological change.
This could be potentially significant because of the positive
spillovers usually associated with innovation. It is an inter-
esting question for future research, therefore, whether this
could change the economic, or indeed the political, calculus
of instrument choice for environmental policy.
Our aim has been to estimate the overall impact of the EU
ETS on directed technological change. However, we have
also looked at what types of technologies those patents pro-
tect, conditional on the estimated treatment effect. Most of
them appear to protect alternative energy and energy storage,
with the remaining ones focusing on energy efficiency. Most
of these additional low-carbon patents belong to chemicals
manufacturers, energy companies, and automobile manu-
facturers (see appendix D for details). These preliminary
conclusions are of course based on conditional estimates,
and future research may give us a more granular picture of
the impact of the EU ETS.
There are many questions, too, that we have not answered
in this paper. For instance, would we have observed a greater
innovation impact if the price of permits had been higher?
Or if the permits had been auctioned instead of allocated for
free? Or if there had been less uncertainty about the policy?
Given the lack of variation in EU ETS rules so far, it has
not been feasible to construct the counterfactual scenarios
needed to test these hypotheses—an EU ETS with different
prices and different allocation rules, for example. The impact
190 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
observed until now of the de facto EU ETS on low-carbon
technological change is consistent with a number of alterna-
tive hypotheses about the impacts of specific future reforms.
Future changes to the rules may provide opportunities to
study the impacts of such reforms.
In focusing on the EU ETS, moreover, we have not iden-
tified what has caused the post-2005 surge in low-carbon
patenting in Europe. The number of low-carbon patents filed
in Europe has risen rapidly in recent years. Our estimates
imply that the EU ETS accounts for only about 2% of the
post-2005 surge. It would be an interesting exploratory exer-
cise to search for the other factors that have contributed to
this development (e.g., renewable energy policies), but at
present, we can only establish that the EU ETS seems to
have played no more than a very limited part.
Our results also have broader policy implications. The EU
ETS forms an integral part of the European Union’s road
map to a low-carbon economy in 2050 (European Com-
mission, 2011). Policymakers in New Zealand, the United
States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere
can also learn from the EU ETS experience. So far it appears
that emissions reductions in the EU ETS have come largely
from such operational changes as fuel switching rather than
technological changes, much as in past emissions trading
programs. Such abatement strategies will not be enough
to reach the EU’s ambitious longer-term targets, however.
New low-carbon technologies are needed. Our results indi-
cate that EU ETS–regulated firms are cognizant of this fact
and are responding accordingly. Even so, because the impact
of emissions trading appears to be concentrated among
a relatively small group of firms, their response appears
to nearly vanish when considered in relation to the over-
all pace and direction of technological change. For this
reason, the System in its current form might not be provid-
ing the economy-wide incentives necessary to bring about
low-carbon technological change on a larger scale.
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